DealLawyers.com Blog

November 5, 2026

Antitrust: The Rise of State Merger Enforcement

This Ethisphere article by two BakerMcKenzie lawyers discusses the increasing role played by state AGs in merger enforcement, and points out that many states have taken a divergent approach from that taken by federal antitrust regulators when it comes to major M&A transactions.

The article provides several recent examples of situations in which state authorities have challenged transactions that their federal counterparts have not, and discusses legislative initiatives to add to the antitrust enforcement tools that state authorities have.  This excerpt summarizes some of the implications of the increased enforcement activity at the state level:

[T]he adoption of legislation in certain states to insert their attorney generals’ offices more directly into the premerger review process is a game changer. With more legislation pending or forthcoming in certain states—including potentially lowering the legal standard for establishing a proposed merger’s illegality—the boundaries for this state-level merger-review framework are not yet firm.

Some contend that the trigger for this recent elevation of state merger enforcement actions is a perceived laxness in antitrust enforcement at the federal level. Regardless of the trigger, however, the rise in state-level merger enforcement introduces a significant new variable that parties must consider as they assess the feasibility of and schedule for closing strategic M&A transactions.

The investments being made at the state level to bulk-up their antitrust enforcement capabilities do not appear temporary, and some return on that investment will be sought. While the political leanings and motivations of antitrust enforcers in some states may shift with a change in administrations at the federal level, the incentives to initiate antitrust scrutiny of strategic combinations will remain strong in others.

The article notes that it’s difficult to predict whether this heightened state-level enforcement activity will endure, but so long as it does, “state-level involvement may complicate and prolong merger reviews—presenting the opportunity to set precedents that may be challenging to overcome or reverse.”

– John Jenkins

November 4, 2026

Cloudflare: VC Laster Certifies Interlocutory Appeal on “Good Faith” Issue

As we blogged last month, Vice Chancellor Laster preliminarily enjoined Cloudflare’s dual class recapitalization based upon his conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the board’s special committee may not have acted in good faith.  Yesterday, the Vice Chancellor certified the defendants’ interlocutory appeal from that ruling in order to permit the Delaware Supreme Court to determine the appropriate standard for assessing good faith under the safe harbors set forth in Section 144 of the DGCL.

In his opinion on the certification application, Vice Chancellor Laster noted that he applied the Disney standard in determining whether the special committee acted in good faith:

In Disney, the Delaware Supreme Court explained that a plaintiff can establish bad faith by proving that a fiduciary intentionally acted “‘with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.’” In Stone v. Ritter, the high court reaffirmed that principle, stating: “‘A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.

He indicated that the defendants seek to apply a different test for establishing bad faith:

The Application seeks to appeal the Good Faith Ruling and claims the court erred in a variety of ways. Although the Application does not say so explicitly, the core issue is whether to overturn the Disney Standard. The defendants argue that a court should only be able to find that directors did not act in good faith if (1) they acted intentionally to harm the corporation, i.e., they acted with malice, or (2) they consciously disregarded known duties, i.e., they engaged in conscious lawbreaking. Those are certainly examples of bad faith—and thankfully rare. But the defendants want those to be the only scenarios in which a lack of good faith exists. The defendants see no role for the Disney Standard’s additional recognition that a fiduciary fails to act in good faith when the fiduciary consciously pursues a purpose other than the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.

Vice Chancellor Laster acknowledged that a decision that the Disney standard is no longer good law is likely “case dispositive” because the plaintiffs do not have a reasonable probability of establishing that the directors sought to harm the company and its stockholders.

He also said that if this case were not one of the first decisions to interpret the good faith requirement of the Section 144 safe harbors established by SB 21, he would not grant the application. However, he went on to say that “[i]f there were a time for the Delaware Supreme Court to revisit the Disney Standard and move in a different direction, it would be now.” Accordingly, he concluded that it was appropriate to ask the Delaware Supreme Court to address this issue and the related issue of whether good faith must be considered on a director-by-director basis in the transactional context.

Hat tip to The Chancery Daily’s Lauren Pringle for the Vice Chancellor’s opinion, which she posted on her LinkedIn page and hasn’t yet been posted on the Chancery Court’s website.

– John Jenkins

November 3, 2026

AI-Related Activism: Activists Pivot from Governance to Valuation

This Goodwin memo highlights how AI-related activism has quickly evolved from a focus on governance to a focus on how AI will impact company value.  As this excerpt explains, this pivot impacts not only what activists seek from companies, but how boards should respond:

A governance argument can be met with a proposed governance solution, for example, adding a director with relevant expertise, enhancing disclosure, or amending committee mandates. A valuation argument requires different types of analysis because it is a claim about what the business is worth and what the board should do to realize that value.

Two campaigns from the past year illustrate the point. In May, Findell Capital Management argued that the market had wrongly written off Figma, Inc. as an AI “laggard.” Three months later, Engine Capital told the board of EPAM Systems, Inc. that the market had priced the company as “a relative loser” amid fears of AI disruption and that the board should respond by either buying back stock aggressively or running a sale process.

Neither activist group was asking the board to improve its understanding of AI; each was claiming that the market had misjudged the company’s future and that the board should act on that view, whether through capital allocation, a clearer investor narrative, or a transaction.

The memo points out that this shift in emphasis by activists is sort of old wine in new bottles, because the solutions activists seek are straight from their traditional playbook – significant stock buybacks, strategic reviews and sales & spin-offs. It also offers advice to boards on how to prepare for this environment, including owning the narrative around the company’s AI initiatives and using engagement to understand investor sentiment about AI before an activist arrives.

– John Jenkins

November 2, 2026

Lawyer Training: Animated Program on Negotiating the “No Undisclosed Liabilities” Rep

If you’re a regular reader, you know I’m a big fan of the M&A training cartoons put out by Hogan Lovells Cadwalader’s Rick Climan, Keith Flaum & Jane Ross.  They’ve recently come out with a new 15-minute program on “How to Negotiate the ‘No Undisclosed Liabilities’ Rep in an M&A Deal” that’s a nice addition to their catalogue. Here’s an excerpt from the description of the program on its YouTube page:

The new cartoon is the sixth in the series of popular M&A negotiating cartoons produced at Hogan Lovells Cadwalader by Rick, Keith, and Jane. Like the other cartoons in the series, this cartoon is intended to teach transactionally oriented associates and law students the intricacies of negotiating contentious issues that arise in M&A deals. Senior lawyers, as well as in-house practitioners and accounting professionals, may also find the new cartoon instructive and illuminating.

As Rick observes, the “no undisclosed liabilities” representation is one of the most important reps in an M&A deal, and the negotiation of the rep “has as much to do with accounting standards as it does… with lawyering.” Rick, representing the sellers, argues for a narrow version of the rep, focused only on GAAP liabilities, while Keith, representing the buyer, seeks a much broader version of the rep that covers contingent, unmatured and potential future liabilities as well. The cartoon concludes by presenting a potential compromise that may carry the day in some M&A scenarios

Rick, Keith and Jane do a terrific job distilling complex concepts in an accessible and understandable fashion. In an era where training new lawyers is becoming ever more challenging, these free resources are a great public service to the profession.

– John Jenkins

October 30, 2026

Del. Chancery Interprets SB 21’s “Controlling Stockholder” Definition

Yesterday, in In re R1 RCM Inc. Merger Litigation (Del. Ch.; 10/26), the Chancery Court refused to dismiss allegations that a minority stockholder in a public company that possessed extensive contractual governance rights, including the ability to veto a variety of transactions and to nominate a majority of the company’s board, was a “Controlling Stockholder” within the meaning of Section 144 of the DGCL.

In assessing the plaintiffs’ allegations, Vice Chancellor Laster first noted that there are three potential triggers for controlling stockholder status set forth in Section 144’s definition of the term. The first trigger is ownership or control of a majority of the stockholder voting power (the “Stock-Majority Trigger”). The second trigger is the ability to cause the election of directors who can exercise a majority of the director voting power (the “Board-Majority Trigger”). The final trigger has three requirements: (1) ownership or control of at least one-third of the stockholder voting power, (2) power functionally equivalent to a majority stockholder, and (3) the ability to exercise managerial authority over the business and affairs of the corporation (the “Non-Majority Trigger”).

Because the stockholder beneficially owned less than a majority of the company’s voting power, the Stock Majority Trigger did not come into play. The Vice Chancellor rejected the plaintiffs’ allegation that the stockholder was a controller under the Non-Majority Trigger because it did not hold one-third of the company’s stockholder voting power unless warrants to purchase the company’s stock were included in the calculation, which the statute did not permit.

However, the Vice Chancellor refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’ allegations that the stockholder was a controller under the statute’s Board-Majority Trigger. In arguing that the Board-Majority Trigger was not satisfied, the defendants argued that statutory language requiring a stockholder to have “the right . . . to cause the election of [its] nominees” meant that a stockholder had to have the ability to make the election of its nominees a fait accompli, and that contractual conditions limiting the exercise of its right kept it from satisfying this requirement. The plaintiffs argued that this trigger could be satisfied by a stockholder having the functional ability to elect nominees.

Vice Chancellor Laster concluded that the plaintiffs had the better of the argument. The two conditions limiting the stockholder’s exercise of discretion with respect to its right to elect a majority of the board were one requiring the board to be comprised of a majority of independent directors if the company’s stock was listed on an exchange (the “Conditional Floor”) and one requiring that any nominee must be “reasonably acceptable” to the company (the “Acceptability Condition”).

As to the first condition, the Vice Chancellor observed that Nasdaq’s independence rules focus on company relationships and do not meaningfully limit the stockholder’s ability to nominate candidates. The defendants argued that Delaware law’s definition of a disinterested director as codified in the Section 144 safe harbor imposes further restrictions that needed to be taken into account.

The Vice Chancellor disagreed, noting that Delaware looks at the disinterestedness requirement on a transaction-specific basis and not through the abstract independence test required by the Conditional Floor. He went on to point out that treating potential transaction-specific conflicts as a total bar to independence would be unworkable, so Delaware law’s approach to disinterestedness should not apply. Accordingly, he did not view the Conditional Floor as imposing limitations on the stockholder’s discretion to nominate candidates sufficient to prevent the Board-Majority Condition to be satisfied.

The Vice Chancellor reached the same conclusion with respect to the Acceptability Condition, noting that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the common law imposes a reasonableness requirement on the exercise of a discretionary contractual right, and that the Acceptability Condition therefore simply restated what “background principles of law would require.”

The plaintiffs contended that once the Board Majority condition had been satisfied, the issue of controlling stockholder status also needed to be assessed under prior common law standards. Vice Chancellor Laster also rejected that argument, and concluded that satisfaction of the Board Majority Condition automatically resulted in classification of a stockholder as a “Controlling Stockholder” under the definition set forth in Section 144 of the DGCL.

– Meredith Ervine

October 29, 2026

Treasury Proposes Rule to Implement COINS Act

Last week, the Department of the Treasury announced a proposed rule to implement the COINS Act, part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2026 and built on the existing Outbound Investment Security Program framework. Treasury also released this fact sheet and FAQs. This Simpson Thacher alert summarizes the key terms:

The proposed rule retains the core architecture of the [Outbound Investment Security Program] in that it prohibits or requires notification of certain types of transactions with sufficient touchpoints to countries of concern and activity in covered sectors. That said, Treasury’s proposal would significantly expand the program’s reach in terms of both geographic scope and technological areas of focus. Most notably, the proposed rule:

– treats all development of artificial intelligence (now referred to as “super intelligence”) systems as prohibited rather than notifiable, regardless of compute power or use case;
– adds three technology sectors: hypersonic systems, high-performance computing and supercomputing, and biotechnology;
– extends the program to five additional countries of concern;
– broadens the definition of “covered foreign person”; and
– creates, for the first time, a process for parties to seek non-binding feedback from Treasury on whether a specific, live transaction would be prohibited.

The proposed rule also introduces several new exceptions and renames the OIR’s “covered transactions” as “covered national security transactions.”

Comments are due by December 7.

– Meredith Ervine 

October 28, 2026

Specific Performance: Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Verisk Decision

In August, I blogged about Verisk Analytics v. ExactLogix (Del. Ch.; 8/26), in which the Delaware Chancery Court held that because a prospective buyer’s actions were the “primary cause” of the FTC issuing a second request that prevented the HSR waiting period from expiring before the “drop dead” date, it could not terminate the merger agreement, and ordered the buyer to continue using commercially reasonable efforts to obtain antitrust clearance and to close the transaction if it was obtained. As Vice Chancellor David’s decision indicates:

The facts of this case stand apart from other broken deal cases in which a buyer tried to avoid its obligation to close. The trial record here revealed virtually no evidence suggesting that Verisk intended to scuttle the deal. Verisk witnesses credibly testified that but for the uncertainty and cost presented by a lengthy Second Request process, AccuLynx remained an attractive acquisition target for Verisk, and no contemporaneous evidence suggests otherwise [. . .]

Verisk met with the FTC nearly 30 times; hired experienced legal advisors, expert economists, and a government affairs firm to advocate for FTC clearance; and spent nearly $8 million in legal fees to review roughly four million documents from 16 custodians under the quick look agreement.

VC David still ordered specific performance because the merger agreement foreclosed termination by a party whose “willful conduct” was the “primary cause” of “the failure to satisfy any condition to the obligations of the Parties,” and “willful conduct” required neither breach nor impropriety. Verisk appealed, and on Friday, in Verisk Analytics v. ExactLogix (Del.; 10/26), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision in a one-paragraph order.

The Cooley blog John shared after the Chancery Court decision had some drafting tips to consider:

Define mental state language deliberately. “Willful conduct,” “willful breach,” “knowing breach” and “intentional breach” are not interchangeable decorations. In Verisk, using different formulations in the same termination section caused the court to assign them different standards. A party that intends termination to be blocked only by deliberate contractual misconduct should say that clearly. Conversely, a seller seeking maximum deal certainty may want a broader conduct-based blocker.

Negotiate the causation standard with the same care. “Prevented,” “materially contributed,” “primarily resulted in” and “primary cause” can produce different burdens. Verisk paired a relatively low mental state threshold with a relatively high causation threshold. The buyer cleared the first hurdle for the seller simply by acting voluntarily; the factual record cleared the second by tying a throughline from one communication by Verisk directly to the FTC’s subsequent investigation.

– Meredith Ervine 

October 27, 2026

Corp Fin Posts New CFIs on Item 2.01 of Form 8-K

I blogged last week on TheCorporateCounsel.net about a new batch of CFI updates that Corp Fin posted on Wednesday. Some of the updates are cleanup, but there are three new CFIs addressing Item 2.01 of Form 8-K, which I’ve summarized below.

Exchange Act Form 8-K, Section 105. Item 2.01 Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets, New Question 105.01

Explains that registrants need only apply the applicable paragraph in Instruction 4 to Item 2.01 of Form 8-K when determining whether an acquisition or disposition is deemed to involve a significant amount of assets. Specifically, (1) a business development company that did not acquire or dispose of a business as determined under Rule 11-01(d) of Regulation S-X would only apply paragraph (iii) of Instruction 4, (2) a registrant that acquired or disposed of a business as determined under Rule 11-01(d) of Regulation S-X would apply only paragraph (ii), and (3) a registrant that is not a business development company and did not acquire or dispose of a business as determined under Rule 11-01(d) of Regulation S-X would apply only paragraph (i).

Exchange Act Forms 8-K, Section 105. Item 2.01 Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets, New Question 105.02

Clarifies that Instruction 4 does not require registrants to include probable acquisitions of related businesses, real estate operations, and funds with the related businesses, real estate operations, and funds that have already been acquired when assessing aggregate significance for purposes of Item 2.01 reporting because Item 2.01 of Form 8-K only requires disclosure regarding completed acquisitions.

Exchange Act Forms 8-K, Section 105. Item 2.01 Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets, New Question 105.03

Provides that registrants should use their most recent balance sheet required to be filed at or prior to the date of the acquisition or disposition, which may be an interim balance sheet, to derive “the total assets of the registrant and its consolidated subsidiaries” required for the significance test outlined in paragraph (i) of Instruction 4 to Item 2.01 of Form 8-K.

As noted in this Governance Beat blog, the direction in Question 105.03 to use the most recent (including an interim) balance sheet differs from the asset test in Reg. S-X, which refers to “the end of the most recently completed fiscal year” and which practitioners had looked to before this CFI. 

– Meredith Ervine 

October 26, 2026

September-October Issue of the Deal Lawyers Newsletter

The September-October issue of the Deal Lawyers newsletter was just sent to the printer and is also available online to members of DealLawyers.com who subscribe to the electronic format. This issue includes the following articles:

– Delaware Court of Chancery Provides Amended Section 144 Analysis in Dodiya v. Franklin
– Delaware Court of Chancery Rejects Board’s Attempt to Read Disclosure Requirements into Advance Notice Bylaws
– Delaware Court Orders Specific Performance of $2.35 Billion Merger After Buyer’s Willful Conduct Triggered FTC Second Request
– No Swerving from Fraud: Delaware Tests the Post-Fortis Landscape
– It’s Renewal Season!

The Deal Lawyers newsletter is always timely & topical – and something you can’t afford to be without to keep up with the rapid-fire developments in the world of M&A. If you don’t subscribe to Deal Lawyers, please email us at info@ccrcorp.com or call us at 800-737-1271.

– Meredith Ervine 

October 23, 2026

Earnouts: Insights from Two Recent Delaware Chancery Court Decisions

Earlier this month, Meredith blogged about the Chancery Court’s decisions in two earnout cases, ACON Igloo Holdings, LLC v. Dometic Corporation, (Del. Ch.; 9/26), and In re Saama Technologies Litigation (Del. Ch., 9/26). This Taft memo says that these two decisions highlight the risks associated with earnouts, and identifies these key insights to be drawn from the decisions:

First, the decisions illustrate the importance of clearly allocating operational control during the earnout period. Earnouts frequently require continued involvement by seller-side management, whose financial incentives may not align with those of the buyer or acquired business. Saama demonstrates the potential consequences when executives exercise that authority to pursue personal financial interests at the company’s expense.

ACON Igloo confirms that a buyer may enforce negotiated ordinary-course limitations even when doing so prevents the seller from achieving an earnout. Transaction documents should therefore expressly address management authority, pricing and discount discretion, operating restrictions, and the circumstances in which buyer approval is required.

Second, earnout disputes are not just contract cases. Saama shows that the same conduct can expose continuing management to personal fiduciary-duty liability. Contractual authority to pursue a target does not shield an executive who knowingly sacrifices the company’s interests to maximize contingent pay. Buyers and sellers should build post-closing governance that addresses these conflicts, including oversight procedures, approval requirements, and careful treatment of management incentives.

Third, both decisions underscore the importance of contemporaneous evidence in post-closing disputes. In each case, the Court closely examined internal communications, financial projections, pricing decisions, and management’s stated reasons for pursuing or rejecting particular business strategies. Those records were central to determining whether the conduct reflected legitimate business judgment, compliance with contractual limitations, or an improper attempt to influence the earnout.

For litigators, the decisions underscore importance of obtaining evidence concerning management’s motivations and the economic consequences of challenged decisions. Transactional counsel should carefully establish clear decision-making procedures and document the business rationale for material operating decisions during the earnout period.

– John Jenkins