DealLawyers.com Blog

November 3, 2026

AI-Related Activism: Activists Pivot from Governance to Valuation

This Goodwin memo highlights how AI-related activism has quickly evolved from a focus on governance to a focus on how AI will impact company value.  As this excerpt explains, this pivot impacts not only what activists seek from companies, but how boards should respond:

A governance argument can be met with a proposed governance solution, for example, adding a director with relevant expertise, enhancing disclosure, or amending committee mandates. A valuation argument requires different types of analysis because it is a claim about what the business is worth and what the board should do to realize that value.

Two campaigns from the past year illustrate the point. In May, Findell Capital Management argued that the market had wrongly written off Figma, Inc. as an AI “laggard.” Three months later, Engine Capital told the board of EPAM Systems, Inc. that the market had priced the company as “a relative loser” amid fears of AI disruption and that the board should respond by either buying back stock aggressively or running a sale process.

Neither activist group was asking the board to improve its understanding of AI; each was claiming that the market had misjudged the company’s future and that the board should act on that view, whether through capital allocation, a clearer investor narrative, or a transaction.

The memo points out that this shift in emphasis by activists is sort of old wine in new bottles, because the solutions activists seek are straight from their traditional playbook – significant stock buybacks, strategic reviews and sales & spin-offs. It also offers advice to boards on how to prepare for this environment, including owning the narrative around the company’s AI initiatives and using engagement to understand investor sentiment about AI before an activist arrives.

– John Jenkins

November 2, 2026

Lawyer Training: Animated Program on Negotiating the “No Undisclosed Liabilities” Rep

If you’re a regular reader, you know I’m a big fan of the M&A training cartoons put out by Hogan Lovells Cadwalader’s Rick Climan, Keith Flaum & Jane Ross.  They’ve recently come out with a new 15-minute program on “How to Negotiate the ‘No Undisclosed Liabilities’ Rep in an M&A Deal” that’s a nice addition to their catalogue. Here’s an excerpt from the description of the program on its YouTube page:

The new cartoon is the sixth in the series of popular M&A negotiating cartoons produced at Hogan Lovells Cadwalader by Rick, Keith, and Jane. Like the other cartoons in the series, this cartoon is intended to teach transactionally oriented associates and law students the intricacies of negotiating contentious issues that arise in M&A deals. Senior lawyers, as well as in-house practitioners and accounting professionals, may also find the new cartoon instructive and illuminating.

As Rick observes, the “no undisclosed liabilities” representation is one of the most important reps in an M&A deal, and the negotiation of the rep “has as much to do with accounting standards as it does… with lawyering.” Rick, representing the sellers, argues for a narrow version of the rep, focused only on GAAP liabilities, while Keith, representing the buyer, seeks a much broader version of the rep that covers contingent, unmatured and potential future liabilities as well. The cartoon concludes by presenting a potential compromise that may carry the day in some M&A scenarios

Rick, Keith and Jane do a terrific job distilling complex concepts in an accessible and understandable fashion. In an era where training new lawyers is becoming ever more challenging, these free resources are a great public service to the profession.

– John Jenkins

October 30, 2026

Del. Chancery Interprets SB 21’s “Controlling Stockholder” Definition

Yesterday, in In re R1 RCM Inc. Merger Litigation (Del. Ch.; 10/26), the Chancery Court refused to dismiss allegations that a minority stockholder in a public company that possessed extensive contractual governance rights, including the ability to veto a variety of transactions and to nominate a majority of the company’s board, was a “Controlling Stockholder” within the meaning of Section 144 of the DGCL.

In assessing the plaintiffs’ allegations, Vice Chancellor Laster first noted that there are three potential triggers for controlling stockholder status set forth in Section 144’s definition of the term. The first trigger is ownership or control of a majority of the stockholder voting power (the “Stock-Majority Trigger”). The second trigger is the ability to cause the election of directors who can exercise a majority of the director voting power (the “Board-Majority Trigger”). The final trigger has three requirements: (1) ownership or control of at least one-third of the stockholder voting power, (2) power functionally equivalent to a majority stockholder, and (3) the ability to exercise managerial authority over the business and affairs of the corporation (the “Non-Majority Trigger”).

Because the stockholder beneficially owned less than a majority of the company’s voting power, the Stock Majority Trigger did not come into play. The Vice Chancellor rejected the plaintiffs’ allegation that the stockholder was a controller under the Non-Majority Trigger because it did not hold one-third of the company’s stockholder voting power unless warrants to purchase the company’s stock were included in the calculation, which the statute did not permit.

However, the Vice Chancellor refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’ allegations that the stockholder was a controller under the statute’s Board-Majority Trigger. In arguing that the Board-Majority Trigger was not satisfied, the defendants argued that statutory language requiring a stockholder to have “the right . . . to cause the election of [its] nominees” meant that a stockholder had to have the ability to make the election of its nominees a fait accompli, and that contractual conditions limiting the exercise of its right kept it from satisfying this requirement. The plaintiffs argued that this trigger could be satisfied by a stockholder having the functional ability to elect nominees.

Vice Chancellor Laster concluded that the plaintiffs had the better of the argument. The two conditions limiting the stockholder’s exercise of discretion with respect to its right to elect a majority of the board were one requiring the board to be comprised of a majority of independent directors if the company’s stock was listed on an exchange (the “Conditional Floor”) and one requiring that any nominee must be “reasonably acceptable” to the company (the “Acceptability Condition”).

As to the first condition, the Vice Chancellor observed that Nasdaq’s independence rules focus on company relationships and do not meaningfully limit the stockholder’s ability to nominate candidates. The defendants argued that Delaware law’s definition of a disinterested director as codified in the Section 144 safe harbor imposes further restrictions that needed to be taken into account.

The Vice Chancellor disagreed, noting that Delaware looks at the disinterestedness requirement on a transaction-specific basis and not through the abstract independence test required by the Conditional Floor. He went on to point out that treating potential transaction-specific conflicts as a total bar to independence would be unworkable, so Delaware law’s approach to disinterestedness should not apply. Accordingly, he did not view the Conditional Floor as imposing limitations on the stockholder’s discretion to nominate candidates sufficient to prevent the Board-Majority Condition to be satisfied.

The Vice Chancellor reached the same conclusion with respect to the Acceptability Condition, noting that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the common law imposes a reasonableness requirement on the exercise of a discretionary contractual right, and that the Acceptability Condition therefore simply restated what “background principles of law would require.”

The plaintiffs contended that once the Board Majority condition had been satisfied, the issue of controlling stockholder status also needed to be assessed under prior common law standards. Vice Chancellor Laster also rejected that argument, and concluded that satisfaction of the Board Majority Condition automatically resulted in classification of a stockholder as a “Controlling Stockholder” under the definition set forth in Section 144 of the DGCL.

– Meredith Ervine

October 29, 2026

Treasury Proposes Rule to Implement COINS Act

Last week, the Department of the Treasury announced a proposed rule to implement the COINS Act, part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2026 and built on the existing Outbound Investment Security Program framework. Treasury also released this fact sheet and FAQs. This Simpson Thacher alert summarizes the key terms:

The proposed rule retains the core architecture of the [Outbound Investment Security Program] in that it prohibits or requires notification of certain types of transactions with sufficient touchpoints to countries of concern and activity in covered sectors. That said, Treasury’s proposal would significantly expand the program’s reach in terms of both geographic scope and technological areas of focus. Most notably, the proposed rule:

– treats all development of artificial intelligence (now referred to as “super intelligence”) systems as prohibited rather than notifiable, regardless of compute power or use case;
– adds three technology sectors: hypersonic systems, high-performance computing and supercomputing, and biotechnology;
– extends the program to five additional countries of concern;
– broadens the definition of “covered foreign person”; and
– creates, for the first time, a process for parties to seek non-binding feedback from Treasury on whether a specific, live transaction would be prohibited.

The proposed rule also introduces several new exceptions and renames the OIR’s “covered transactions” as “covered national security transactions.”

Comments are due by December 7.

– Meredith Ervine 

October 28, 2026

Specific Performance: Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Verisk Decision

In August, I blogged about Verisk Analytics v. ExactLogix (Del. Ch.; 8/26), in which the Delaware Chancery Court held that because a prospective buyer’s actions were the “primary cause” of the FTC issuing a second request that prevented the HSR waiting period from expiring before the “drop dead” date, it could not terminate the merger agreement, and ordered the buyer to continue using commercially reasonable efforts to obtain antitrust clearance and to close the transaction if it was obtained. As Vice Chancellor David’s decision indicates:

The facts of this case stand apart from other broken deal cases in which a buyer tried to avoid its obligation to close. The trial record here revealed virtually no evidence suggesting that Verisk intended to scuttle the deal. Verisk witnesses credibly testified that but for the uncertainty and cost presented by a lengthy Second Request process, AccuLynx remained an attractive acquisition target for Verisk, and no contemporaneous evidence suggests otherwise [. . .]

Verisk met with the FTC nearly 30 times; hired experienced legal advisors, expert economists, and a government affairs firm to advocate for FTC clearance; and spent nearly $8 million in legal fees to review roughly four million documents from 16 custodians under the quick look agreement.

VC David still ordered specific performance because the merger agreement foreclosed termination by a party whose “willful conduct” was the “primary cause” of “the failure to satisfy any condition to the obligations of the Parties,” and “willful conduct” required neither breach nor impropriety. Verisk appealed, and on Friday, in Verisk Analytics v. ExactLogix (Del.; 10/26), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision in a one-paragraph order.

The Cooley blog John shared after the Chancery Court decision had some drafting tips to consider:

Define mental state language deliberately. “Willful conduct,” “willful breach,” “knowing breach” and “intentional breach” are not interchangeable decorations. In Verisk, using different formulations in the same termination section caused the court to assign them different standards. A party that intends termination to be blocked only by deliberate contractual misconduct should say that clearly. Conversely, a seller seeking maximum deal certainty may want a broader conduct-based blocker.

Negotiate the causation standard with the same care. “Prevented,” “materially contributed,” “primarily resulted in” and “primary cause” can produce different burdens. Verisk paired a relatively low mental state threshold with a relatively high causation threshold. The buyer cleared the first hurdle for the seller simply by acting voluntarily; the factual record cleared the second by tying a throughline from one communication by Verisk directly to the FTC’s subsequent investigation.

– Meredith Ervine 

October 27, 2026

Corp Fin Posts New CFIs on Item 2.01 of Form 8-K

I blogged last week on TheCorporateCounsel.net about a new batch of CFI updates that Corp Fin posted on Wednesday. Some of the updates are cleanup, but there are three new CFIs addressing Item 2.01 of Form 8-K, which I’ve summarized below.

Exchange Act Form 8-K, Section 105. Item 2.01 Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets, New Question 105.01

Explains that registrants need only apply the applicable paragraph in Instruction 4 to Item 2.01 of Form 8-K when determining whether an acquisition or disposition is deemed to involve a significant amount of assets. Specifically, (1) a business development company that did not acquire or dispose of a business as determined under Rule 11-01(d) of Regulation S-X would only apply paragraph (iii) of Instruction 4, (2) a registrant that acquired or disposed of a business as determined under Rule 11-01(d) of Regulation S-X would apply only paragraph (ii), and (3) a registrant that is not a business development company and did not acquire or dispose of a business as determined under Rule 11-01(d) of Regulation S-X would apply only paragraph (i).

Exchange Act Forms 8-K, Section 105. Item 2.01 Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets, New Question 105.02

Clarifies that Instruction 4 does not require registrants to include probable acquisitions of related businesses, real estate operations, and funds with the related businesses, real estate operations, and funds that have already been acquired when assessing aggregate significance for purposes of Item 2.01 reporting because Item 2.01 of Form 8-K only requires disclosure regarding completed acquisitions.

Exchange Act Forms 8-K, Section 105. Item 2.01 Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets, New Question 105.03

Provides that registrants should use their most recent balance sheet required to be filed at or prior to the date of the acquisition or disposition, which may be an interim balance sheet, to derive “the total assets of the registrant and its consolidated subsidiaries” required for the significance test outlined in paragraph (i) of Instruction 4 to Item 2.01 of Form 8-K.

As noted in this Governance Beat blog, the direction in Question 105.03 to use the most recent (including an interim) balance sheet differs from the asset test in Reg. S-X, which refers to “the end of the most recently completed fiscal year” and which practitioners had looked to before this CFI. 

– Meredith Ervine 

October 26, 2026

September-October Issue of the Deal Lawyers Newsletter

The September-October issue of the Deal Lawyers newsletter was just sent to the printer and is also available online to members of DealLawyers.com who subscribe to the electronic format. This issue includes the following articles:

– Delaware Court of Chancery Provides Amended Section 144 Analysis in Dodiya v. Franklin
– Delaware Court of Chancery Rejects Board’s Attempt to Read Disclosure Requirements into Advance Notice Bylaws
– Delaware Court Orders Specific Performance of $2.35 Billion Merger After Buyer’s Willful Conduct Triggered FTC Second Request
– No Swerving from Fraud: Delaware Tests the Post-Fortis Landscape
– It’s Renewal Season!

The Deal Lawyers newsletter is always timely & topical – and something you can’t afford to be without to keep up with the rapid-fire developments in the world of M&A. If you don’t subscribe to Deal Lawyers, please email us at info@ccrcorp.com or call us at 800-737-1271.

– Meredith Ervine 

October 23, 2026

Earnouts: Insights from Two Recent Delaware Chancery Court Decisions

Earlier this month, Meredith blogged about the Chancery Court’s decisions in two earnout cases, ACON Igloo Holdings, LLC v. Dometic Corporation, (Del. Ch.; 9/26), and In re Saama Technologies Litigation (Del. Ch., 9/26). This Taft memo says that these two decisions highlight the risks associated with earnouts, and identifies these key insights to be drawn from the decisions:

First, the decisions illustrate the importance of clearly allocating operational control during the earnout period. Earnouts frequently require continued involvement by seller-side management, whose financial incentives may not align with those of the buyer or acquired business. Saama demonstrates the potential consequences when executives exercise that authority to pursue personal financial interests at the company’s expense.

ACON Igloo confirms that a buyer may enforce negotiated ordinary-course limitations even when doing so prevents the seller from achieving an earnout. Transaction documents should therefore expressly address management authority, pricing and discount discretion, operating restrictions, and the circumstances in which buyer approval is required.

Second, earnout disputes are not just contract cases. Saama shows that the same conduct can expose continuing management to personal fiduciary-duty liability. Contractual authority to pursue a target does not shield an executive who knowingly sacrifices the company’s interests to maximize contingent pay. Buyers and sellers should build post-closing governance that addresses these conflicts, including oversight procedures, approval requirements, and careful treatment of management incentives.

Third, both decisions underscore the importance of contemporaneous evidence in post-closing disputes. In each case, the Court closely examined internal communications, financial projections, pricing decisions, and management’s stated reasons for pursuing or rejecting particular business strategies. Those records were central to determining whether the conduct reflected legitimate business judgment, compliance with contractual limitations, or an improper attempt to influence the earnout.

For litigators, the decisions underscore importance of obtaining evidence concerning management’s motivations and the economic consequences of challenged decisions. Transactional counsel should carefully establish clear decision-making procedures and document the business rationale for material operating decisions during the earnout period.

– John Jenkins

October 22, 2026

Advance Notice Bylaws: Insights from the ATG Capital Opportunities Fund Decision

In September, I blogged about the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in the ATG Capital Opportunities case, in which the Court held that the board of Empery Digital improperly rejected an activist’s slate based on disclosure requirements that Vice Chancellor Will concluded weren’t contained in the company’s advance notice bylaw.  This Cooley blog discusses the Chancery Court’s decision, and identifies the following things to keep in mind when dealing with advance notice bylaws:

– Draft bylaws with precision.Delaware courts will enforce clear advance notice bylaws, but they will not supply missing disclosure obligations. Stockholders are not expected to deduce disclosure requirements or “guess” what a board might interpret bylaws to require. Boards should consult with counsel to ensure that advance notice bylaws are clear, appropriately comprehensive and reasonably constructed so as not to inequitably interfere with the stockholder franchise.

– Use advance notice bylaws to inform stockholders, not to displace them. Advance notice bylaws help boards evaluate nominations and communicate with stockholders. They do not authorize incumbents to exclude nominees because they disagree with an activist’s strategy, incentives or expected business plan. Ultimately, advance notice bylaws cannot be misused to thwart stockholder choice or entrench existing directors.

– Make rejection decisions disciplined and record-based. Rejecting a nomination notice is a consequential step. It involves legal, reputational and strategic considerations. Boards should work closely with counsel to identify material deficiencies tethered to the bylaws’ plain language, document the specific grounds in the deficiency letter and avoid shifting theories later. In providing a rejection or deficiency letter to an activist, boards do well to provide a letter that is based in fact, even handed and prepared in good faith. As the court emphasized, “Advance notice bylaws are not moving targets.”

– John Jenkins

October 21, 2026

Shareholder Activism: Q3 Developments

Barclays’ latest review of quarterly activism developments covering the third quarter and 2026 year-to-date was released earlier this month. Activity was down somewhat, and the U.S. was driving that trend. Here are some key findings:

– 179 campaigns were launched in 2026 YTD, down 7% year-over-year (192), but largely in line with the four-year average– 43 campaigns in Q3 represented a 42% drop from 74 in Q2, reflecting a more normal “seasonal slowdown” compared to what was an unusually busy Q3 2025 (62).

– The U.S. remained the primary market for activism with 91 campaigns (51% share of global activity), above its four-year YTD average of 86.

– A record level of concentration in the top five sectors targeted by activists (82%), led by Industrials (30%) and Technology (20%).

– The overall number of activists continued to track lower in 2026, down 14% year-over-year to 99– Elliott launched the most campaigns YTD with 16 across seven countries; three of its Q3 launches were among the largest in 2026.

– 58% of Q3 demands were M&A-related; the surge of M&A demands lifted the YTD mark to 44% of all demands, now in line with the four-year average after a slow start to the year.

– Activists won 87 board seats YTD, 10% below the four-year average, with wins concentrated among Elliott, Starboard and Engine, which accounted for one-third of the total.

– John Jenkins