We’ve blogged a couple of times (here’s the most recent) about the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Berger v. Fox, (Del. Ch.; 7/26), which clarified some of the uncertainties about disclosure of M&A advisor conflicts created by prior decisions. This Hogan Lovells Cadwalader memo addresses the the decision, and this excerpt discusses some of the key insights to be drawn from the case:
– Berger is a reminder of the power of the Corwin doctrine in Delaware. Under Corwin, the business judgment rule applies when a non-controller transaction is approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders. Where those conditions are satisfied, the typical result is dismissal of all fiduciary-related claims.
– A key feature of Corwin is the requirement that the stockholder vote be “fully informed.” Plaintiffs often attempt to pierce Corwin’s otherwise sturdy protections by raising alleged disclosure deficiencies. However, Berger reaffirms that the requisite deficiencies must be “material”—i.e., there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable stockholder would consider them important in deciding how to vote.
– Delaware courts will closely scrutinize potential advisor conflicts and require full disclosure of investment banker compensation and potential conflicts in the proxy statement provided to stockholders. Berger, however, clarifies that when a financial advisor faces a conflict, it is generally sufficient for the board to disclose “the relationship itself and the amount of fees the advisor received.” The board is not required to disclose “the specific fees a financial advisor received from unrelated work for a transactional counterparty,” so long as the relationship and a “rough scale” of those fees are disclosed.
– The Court also declined to allow a lack of disclosure about concurrent law firm representation to defeat Corwin. An arm’s-length deal, negotiated by an indisputably independent board, will not lose Corwin protection on such a basis, absent allegations that the representations were “material” to the law firm and compromised the integrity of its legal services.
The memo says that Berger also highlights the board’s ability to rely on advisors that have relationships with counterparties without losing the ability to rely on Corwin. In order to do so, those potential conflicts should be identified as soon as possible and all material information about them should be disclosed to stockholders in advance of their vote on the transaction.
Earlier this year, I blogged about the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Feeney Brothers Excavation Trust v. Artera Services, (Del. Ch.; 7/26), where the Court rejected claims that a buyer breached the terms of an Equity Purchase Agreement by failing to provide what sellers alleged was an agreed upon dollar amount of rollover equity. This Davis Wright memo discusses the Feeney Brothers case and offers up the following practical considerations for sellers considering an equity rollover:
Diligence and documentation should work together. If a seller’s decision to accept rollover equity depends materially on the buyer’s capitalization, financial condition, or other investment attributes, those issues should be evaluated during diligence and, where appropriate, addressed in the transaction documents.
The rights attached to the securities may matter as much as stated valuation. Different securities assigned the same transaction price can carry materially different economic rights depending on liquidation preferences, governance rights, redemption features, or other structural terms.
Contractual definitions and recitals may not function as value guarantees. Feeney Brothers reflects Delaware courts’ reluctance to transform transaction mechanics or “deemed value” concepts into substantive representations regarding intrinsic value where the agreement does not expressly provide them.
Anti-reliance provisions matter.Transaction agreements frequently contain “anti-reliance” clauses, which are designed to define the specific representations on which the parties are entitled to rely and to prevent later claims based on statements made outside the contract itself, such as diligence presentations, projections, or informal discussions. Delaware courts regularly enforce these provisions in transactions among sophisticated parties. In Feeney Brothers, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the sellers agreed they were relying only on the representations expressly contained in the rollover agreement, which precluded fraud claims based on alleged statements made outside the written agreements regarding the value of the rollover equity.
Rollover equity presents both opportunity and risk. As the Delaware Court of Chancery recognized in Feeney Brothers, the sellers chose to receive part of their proceeds in equity rather than take an all-cash deal. That gave them the chance to benefit if the business increased in value after closing, but it also meant accepting the risk that the investment could lose value over time. Unless the transaction documents specifically provide otherwise, rollover equity is generally not a guaranteed return.
The memo says that the bottom line for sellers is that they should treat rollover equity as a new investment instead of another form of consideration. Accordingly, they should conduct appropriate due diligence into the investment and address key investment assumptions in the transaction documents.
This Mayer Brown blog takes a look at the avalanche of accountant true-up lawsuits that have been working their way through the Delaware Chancery Court this year. It provides some key takeaways from recent judicial decisions, reviews how these true-up mechanisms work and how Delaware courts approach them, and offers some practical guidance on how to draft true-up provisions in order to avoid ending up spending years in litigation. Here’s an excerpt:
1. Label the process clearly. State expressly in the PPA or earnout provision that the dispute mechanism is an accountant true-up and that the accountant acts as an expert, not an arbitrator. This generally removes much of the ambiguity that would otherwise require court review.
2. Define precisely what the accountant can decide. The scope of the accountant’s authority is the central and by far most litigated issue in PPA and earnout disputes. Traditional true-up provisions are often silent or unclear on this key aspect, opening the door to court involvement. Parties can help themselves most by surveying the true-up provision and clearly identifying what elements are and are not within the accountant’s expertise.
3. Be clear about the interplay between the true-up provision and other remedies like indemnification and representations and warranties insurance (RWI). Many of the opinions turn on whether a claim belongs in the true-up or in the indemnification regime. Parties should state expressly that items resolved through the true-up cannot be recovered again as indemnifiable losses and that a claim being styled as a representation breach does not take it out of the true-up if it concerns the calculation of a PPA or earnout component. They should also check that the RWI policy’s exclusions for PPAs line up with that allocation, so neither side ends up without a forum or a source of recovery.
The blog’s discussion of the need to define precisely what the accountant can decide is accompanied by a very helpful deep dive into the matters are best resolved by an accountant, those that are potentially within an accountant’s expertise, and those that are best suited to resolution by a court.
Cooley recently published its 2026 Activism Retrospective. One of the topics highlighted in the publication is the increasing convergence between activist tactics and those of private equity buyers. This excerpt explains what’s going on:
Activist hedge funds and private equity firms share fundamental similarities – and the line between them has blurred, as each has adopted the other’s tactics. When a company is underperforming or misunderstood by the market, it is often seen as an opportunity for both activist engagement and private equity investment. This convergence is logical. Activists and private equity firms are ultimately value investors, and certain qualities that make a company an attractive target for activism are not dissimilar to those that might drive a go-private transaction.
Well-capitalized activists, like Carl Icahn, Elliott, Pershing Square and Trian, have demonstrated their willingness and ability to take their portfolio companies private. In some cases, activists have partnered with private equity funds to form formidable buyer consortiums. In others, they have signed the check themselves, including in multibillion-dollar transactions.
This year, activists with fewer assets under management ventured into private-equity-style go-private transactions involving their portfolio companies. This was particularly true during the first half of 2026, as the M&A market was meaningfully bifurcated. While large capitalization companies enjoyed relatively smooth dealmaking terrain, the middle market was less active. As a result, activists attempted to nudge their smaller portfolio companies into dealmaking – at times, coupling traditional activist tactics, such as public pressure campaigns and proxy contests, with proposals to acquire their target.
The publication also addresses the evolving role of AI-related issues in activist strategies, and the increasing use of informal settlements. It also comments on what to expect in 2027, and the excerpt addresses the role that M&A demands are expected to play next year:
Where activists and companies cannot find alignment, we expect M&A theses to be both prevalent and a key point of divergence between investors and issuers. While ever an important play on the activist call sheet, the M&A push stands to be escalated at smaller companies that have watched their larger competitors continue to grow and have suffered from a selective private equity industry that spent 2026 writing larger tickets on a more targeted transaction profile. In addition, if sponsors continue to sit on dry powder, more activists might explore putting their capital to work in the private equity mold, including with the hope of drawing private equity firms off the sidelines.
Earlier this week, inAssad v. Clark, et al. (Del. Ch.; 11/26), in resolving cross-motions for summary judgment, Vice Chancellor David found that a company was required to distribute “all legally available assets” following a sale of substantially all of its assets pursuant to the terms of its certificate of incorporation. The company hadn’t planned to do that and had disclosed as much.
The asset purchase agreement permitted the company to retain net operating loss carryforwards, but the company otherwise did not retain any material non-cash assets after closing. When the company announced the transaction, it told the minority stockholders that the company did not intend to liquidate and its board of directors would instead “evaluate alternatives” to use the cash proceeds from the sale, including possible acquisitions of other operating businesses “without limitation as to industry.”
The information statement said:
The Company, and not its stockholders, will receive the proceeds from the [Asset Sale]. The Company Board intends to use the proceeds from the [Asset Sale] to identify opportunities to monetize its NOLs. The Company Board may consider acquisitions of operating businesses, without limitation as to industry. Subject to certain restrictive covenants contained in the [APA], following the Closing, where beneficial, the Company intends to apply AI and automation to improve the profitability of any business it acquires. The Company Board may also consider other uses of the proceeds, which could include a return of capital to stockholders.
The company had two classes of common stock, and its charter provided that, “In the event of a Liquidation Event […] the assets of the Corporation legally available for distribution to stockholders shall be distributed on an equal priority, pro rata basis to the holders of Common Stock.” It also defined “Liquidation Event” to include any “Asset Transfer,” which included “a sale, lease, exclusive license or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the Corporation.”
The transaction was approved by the board and the company’s majority stockholders and closed in September. Two days after closing, a Class B common stockholder filed suit, alleging the company breached its charter by failing to distribute all assets legally available after closing and that its directors breached their fiduciary duties by causing the charter breach.
The parties stipulated that the sale constituted a sale of substantially all of the company’s assets, making it a liquidation event. Defendants argued that the provision didn’t trigger a distribution on a liquidation event, but instead set out how a distribution would occur if and when the company determined to make one as part of a liquidation event.
VC David disagreed. She noted that the provision says the assets “shall be distributed,” rather than using words like “when, as and if,” which appear elsewhere in the charter. She also noted that the charter contained another “equal treatment” provision, and that the two would be duplicative if it did not mandate the distribution.
John noted last week that Vice Chancellor Laster certified the defendants’ interlocutory appeal from his ruling granting a preliminary injunction of Cloudflare’s dual-class recapitalization because there was a reasonable probability that the board’s special committee may not have acted in good faith. The Delaware Supreme Court has now accepted the interlocutory appeal to address “gating and case-dispositive questions of law relating to the merits of the case,” namely “whether a ‘controlled mindset’ premised on controller influence can satisfy the individualized finding of bad faith as to otherwise independent, disinterested, and careful directors under the statute.”
We’ll also know the Court’s decision in relatively short order. The Delaware Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for expedited proceedings and set deadlines of November 18 for the opening brief, December 9 for the answering brief and December 16 for reply.
This Pillsbury alert discusses how controlling the use of AI in M&A is a key part of preventing the misuse of confidential business information during the course of a transaction. It argues:
AI can make confidential deal information easier to share, harder to control and more difficult to delete. NDAs, CTAs and deal protocols should expressly address how AI may be used in the context of an M&A transaction. Before diligence begins, legal teams on both sides should agree on permitted AI tools and uses, and then confirm with IT that the technical settings actually implement those restrictions.
Because most forms of NDAs and clean team agreements (CTAs) were written before AI use was prevalent, AI can become a loophole for disclosure of confidential information if these forms aren’t updated to address this risk. The alert details seventeen suggestions for NDAs, CTAs and the negotiation process to maintain confidentiality. Here are a few:
Clarify Disclosure and Use. Many existing NDAs do not address AI at all. A company should update its form so that entering or uploading confidential information into an AI system or large language model operated by a third party is treated as a disclosure, which the recipient may make only as the NDA permits.
Limit AI Usage. The NDA should restrict how the recipient uses AI with confidential information. A disclosing party with especially sensitive information may prefer to prohibit AI use altogether, or for a defined subset of its information. Where AI use is allowed, it can be limited to tools that: (i) are enterprise deployments under a written contract, (ii) do not retain inputs or outputs containing or reflecting confidential information beyond the session, or delete them within a set period or on written request, (iii) do not use inputs to train or improve models, including the receiving party’s own models, and (iv) require the provider and its subprocessors to be bound by confidentiality obligations acceptable to the disclosing party. The major enterprise offerings generally commit not to train on business data by default and give administrators control over retention, but terms differ by product and subscription level and should be checked rather than assumed. A schedule of pre-approved AI tools can also be attached.
Summaries and Analyses. Summaries, analyses and other output generated by AI from confidential information should themselves be defined as confidential information.
“Residual” Clauses. A residuals clause lets the recipient use confidential information retained in the unaided memory of its personnel. If a company accepts a residuals clause, it should make clear that information stored in, retrieved from or processed by an AI tool is not “unaided memory.”
Return or Destruction. The return or destruction provision should require the recipient to delete confidential information from its AI tools as well, including prompt histories, chat logs, vector databases and other indexes, subject to negotiated exceptions for backups and legally required retention with appropriate safeguards. Once information has been used to train a model, removing it may be difficult or impossible. Researchers have pointed out that removing information from an AI model is fundamentally different from deleting a record from a database, which is one more reason to prohibit such training in the first place.
Late last month, in In re Illumina, Inc. Consolidated Derivative Stockholder Litigation (Del. Ch.; 10/26), Vice Chancellor Fioravanti dismissed a stockholder derivative action alleging that the officers and directors of Illumina breached their fiduciary duties by causing the company to consummate a merger in violation of law. VC Fioravanti determined a majority of Illumina’s directors did not face a substantial likelihood of liability because plaintiffs failed to plead a known violation of EU or U.S. law, and therefore failed to plead demand futility. Here’s more from Wachtell:
The case concerned the decision by the board of directors of Illumina, Inc. to approve the closing of the company’s acquisition of GRAIL. At the time, the European Commission had opened an antitrust investigation even though GRAIL had no revenue in the EU, purportedly triggering a statutory standstill against closing. Illumina sued to challenge the EC’s unprecedented exercise of jurisdiction, arguing that the standstill did not apply. The U.S. FTC was also pursuing an administrative action against the transaction, but had withdrawn its lawsuit seeking a preliminary injunction in light of the standstill, leaving no legal bar to closing in the U.S.
After informing itself of the relevant law and regulatory landscape, including by engaging legal counsel, Illumina’s board voted to close the transaction.
Following several years of litigation, Illumina ultimately won its legal challenge against the EC’s jurisdiction […] In the U.S., the FTC’s litigation was effectively mooted without any final resolution when Illumina later decided that it would divest GRAIL.
Meanwhile, Illumina stockholder plaintiffs sued, claiming that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by causing Illumina to violate the law by closing the GRAIL transaction despite the purported EC standstill and FTC opposition[.]
VC Fioravanti concluded that there was no knowing violation of law and that the directors were “‘informed of the legal risks of closing and made an informed decision’ to close while continuing to litigate the company’s position.”
The Court of Chancery’s decision reaffirms that disinterested, independent directors can decide in good faith to accept regulatory risk based on their well-informed belief in the validity of their company’s legal position.
Equity method investments are pretty common and have a lot going for them from a financial reporting perspective for the entity making the investment. That’s why last week’s announcement by FASB that its issuing a proposed ASU that would tweak the criteria for applying the equity method is kind of a big deal. Here’s an excerpt from the announcement:
During the FASB’s 2025 agenda consultation and other outreach, stakeholders identified challenges related to the equity method of accounting guidance. Those challenges include (1) the different criteria for applying the equity method to investments in corporations (and similar entities) and investments in partnerships (and similar entities), (2) the lack of authoritative guidance on allocating earnings in complex allocation structures for investments in non-real-estate entities, and (3) the cost and complexity of applying the equity method.
To address that feedback and help reduce overall cost and complexity, the proposed ASU would:
– Require a single threshold (significant influence) for applying the equity method, regardless of the legal form of the entity, and make certain changes to the indicators of significant influence in Subtopic 323-10, Investments—Equity Method and Joint Ventures—Overall
– Clarify how the equity method is applied by investors that have equity method investments with complex allocation structures.
Check out Meredith’s blog on TheCorporateCounsel.net from earlier this week for more details on the proposal. Comments on FASB’s exposure draft of the ASU are due by January 11, 2027.
This Ethisphere article by two BakerMcKenzie lawyers discusses the increasing role played by state AGs in merger enforcement, and points out that many states have taken a divergent approach from that taken by federal antitrust regulators when it comes to major M&A transactions.
The article provides several recent examples of situations in which state authorities have challenged transactions that their federal counterparts have not, and discusses legislative initiatives to add to the antitrust enforcement tools that state authorities have. This excerpt summarizes some of the implications of the increased enforcement activity at the state level:
[T]he adoption of legislation in certain states to insert their attorney generals’ offices more directly into the premerger review process is a game changer. With more legislation pending or forthcoming in certain states—including potentially lowering the legal standard for establishing a proposed merger’s illegality—the boundaries for this state-level merger-review framework are not yet firm.
Some contend that the trigger for this recent elevation of state merger enforcement actions is a perceived laxness in antitrust enforcement at the federal level. Regardless of the trigger, however, the rise in state-level merger enforcement introduces a significant new variable that parties must consider as they assess the feasibility of and schedule for closing strategic M&A transactions.
The investments being made at the state level to bulk-up their antitrust enforcement capabilities do not appear temporary, and some return on that investment will be sought. While the political leanings and motivations of antitrust enforcers in some states may shift with a change in administrations at the federal level, the incentives to initiate antitrust scrutiny of strategic combinations will remain strong in others.
The article notes that it’s difficult to predict whether this heightened state-level enforcement activity will endure, but so long as it does, “state-level involvement may complicate and prolong merger reviews—presenting the opportunity to set precedents that may be challenging to overcome or reverse.”