As I’ve previously blogged, some commentators have suggested a driving force behind the SPAC boom may be the availability of the PSLRA safe harbor for a de-SPAC merger. The availability of the safe harbor supposedly provides greater freedom for sponsors to share projections than would be the case in an IPO, to which the safe harbor doesn’t apply. The presumed availability of the safe harbor is one reason why some have suggested that a de-SPAC transaction involves less risk than a traditional IPO.
In a statement issued yesterday, the Acting Director of Corp Fin, John Coates, called the assumption that de-SPAC deals involve less liability risk than traditional IPOs into question. Here’s an excerpt:
It is not clear that claims about the application of securities law liability provisions to de-SPACs provide targets or anyone else with a reason to prefer SPACs over traditional IPOs. Any simple claim about reduced liability exposure for SPAC participants is overstated at best, and potentially seriously misleading at worst. Indeed, in some ways, liability risks for those involved are higher, not lower, than in conventional IPOs, due in particular to the potential conflicts of interest in the SPAC structure.
More specifically, any material misstatement in or omission from an effective Securities Act registration statement as part of a de-SPAC business combination is subject to Securities Act Section 11. Equally clear is that any material misstatement or omission in connection with a proxy solicitation is subject to liability under Exchange Act Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, under which courts and the Commission have generally applied a “negligence” standard. Any material misstatement or omission in connection with a tender offer is subject to liability under Exchange Act Section 14(e).
De-SPAC transactions also may give rise to liability under state law. Delaware corporate law, in particular, conventionally applies both a duty of candor and fiduciary duties more strictly in conflict of interest settings, absent special procedural steps, which themselves may be a source of liability risk. Given this legal landscape, SPAC sponsors and targets should already be hearing from their legal, accounting, and financial advisors that a de-SPAC transaction gives no one a free pass for material misstatements or omissions.
Director Coates also highlighted the limitations of the PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements. Among other things, he noted that it only applies in private litigation, not SEC enforcement proceedings, applies only to forward-looking statements, and doesn’t apply to statements that are made with actual knowledge of their falsity. He also suggested that a de-SPAC merger may well be regarded as an “initial public offering” not subject to the safe harbor, and raised the possibility of clarifying rulemaking from the SEC concerning the scope of the safe harbor and its application to SPAC transactions.
– John Jenkins