November 19, 2026
M&A Advisor Disclosures: More on Berger v. Fox
We’ve blogged a couple of times (here’s the most recent) about the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Berger v. Fox, (Del. Ch.; 7/26), which clarified some of the uncertainties about disclosure of M&A advisor conflicts created by prior decisions. This Hogan Lovells Cadwalader memo addresses the the decision, and this excerpt discusses some of the key insights to be drawn from the case:
– Berger is a reminder of the power of the Corwin doctrine in Delaware. Under Corwin, the business judgment rule applies when a non-controller transaction is approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders. Where those conditions are satisfied, the typical result is dismissal of all fiduciary-related claims.
– A key feature of Corwin is the requirement that the stockholder vote be “fully informed.” Plaintiffs often attempt to pierce Corwin’s otherwise sturdy protections by raising alleged disclosure deficiencies. However, Berger reaffirms that the requisite deficiencies must be “material”—i.e., there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable stockholder would consider them important in deciding how to vote.
– Delaware courts will closely scrutinize potential advisor conflicts and require full disclosure of investment banker compensation and potential conflicts in the proxy statement provided to stockholders. Berger, however, clarifies that when a financial advisor faces a conflict, it is generally sufficient for the board to disclose “the relationship itself and the amount of fees the advisor received.” The board is not required to disclose “the specific fees a financial advisor received from unrelated work for a transactional counterparty,” so long as the relationship and a “rough scale” of those fees are disclosed.
– The Court also declined to allow a lack of disclosure about concurrent law firm representation to defeat Corwin. An arm’s-length deal, negotiated by an indisputably independent board, will not lose Corwin protection on such a basis, absent allegations that the representations were “material” to the law firm and compromised the integrity of its legal services.
The memo says that Berger also highlights the board’s ability to rely on advisors that have relationships with counterparties without losing the ability to rely on Corwin. In order to do so, those potential conflicts should be identified as soon as possible and all material information about them should be disclosed to stockholders in advance of their vote on the transaction.
– John Jenkins
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